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Turning the Page: The Demise of the
“Queenan Doctrine” Requiring the Adoption
of a Foreclosure Valuation Methodology in
Chapter 11 Cases
Harrison Denman*
This Article traces the evolution of the default standard applied by
bankruptcy courts to valuing a secured lender’s collateral under
section 506(a) for purposes of determining whether a “diminution
in value” has occurred sufficient to trigger the need for adequate
protection. Historically, bankruptcy courts applied a standard
premised on the scholarship of Judge Queenan of the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Massachusetts. That standard called for,
absent contractual language to the contrary, application of a
foreclosure valuation methodology regardless of the actual or
anticipated use of such collateral during the chapter 11 cases. In
recent years, there has been a trend away from Judge Queenan’s
rigid methodology in favor of a more flexible standard that takes
its cue from the particular facts relating to the collateral’s use in
each chapter 11 case—leading, typically, to the application of a
fair market value standard.

*
Partner in the Financial Restructuring and Insolvency Practice Group of White & Case
LLP. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases with large capital structures frequently
feature a common form of dispute—a valuation fight between secured
creditors and unsecured creditors over the appropriate value of a secured
creditor’s collateral. The reason for this dispute is fundamental to Chapter
11—any value not attributed to a secured creditor’s collateral will usually
be attributed to unencumbered assets and thereby be available for pro rata
distribution to an estate’s general unsecured creditors.
Section 506(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code governs these disputes over
the valuation of a secured creditor’s collateral. That section provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest, or that is
subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest
in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of
the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such
creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less
than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall
be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and
of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and
in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use
or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.1

1

11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
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The valuation under section 506(a) can be undertaken by the court in
any of various contexts. When the valuation is undertaken to determine
whether a secured creditor’s collateral has diminished in value over the
course of a Chapter 11 case, it implicates the bankruptcy concept of
adequate protection. Adequate protection is not defined by the Bankruptcy
Code. Generally speaking, the concept is meant to conform the various
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code with the preservation of a secured
creditor’s private property rights enshrined in the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.2
Three different sections of the Bankruptcy Code require that a secured
creditor’s interest in an asset of the debtor be “adequately protected”
during the debtor’s Chapter 11 cases. First, section 362(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay and
permit a secured creditor to take action against its collateral, to the extent
the secured creditor demonstrates that its interest in that collateral is not
adequately protected.3 Second, section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
requires that a secured creditor receive adequate protection of its interest
in an asset in connection with the debtor’s use, sale or lease of the asset
during the Chapter 11 case.4 Third, section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code
permits a bankruptcy court to approve post-petition financing that primes
the lien of a pre-petition secured creditor to the extent that the pre-petition
secured creditor receives adequate protection of its interest in that
property.5 Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code, in turn, specifies three

See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“ . . . nor shall any person be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”); see also Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273
(1940); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 339 (1977) (“The concept is derived from the fifth
amendment protection of property interests.”).
3
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (“On request of a party in interest . . . the court shall grant relief
from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating,
annulling, modifying or conditioning such stay—(1) for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest.”).
4
11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (“[O]n request of an entity that has an interest in property . . .
proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing,
shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate
protection of such interest.”).
5
11 U.S.C. § 364 (“The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining
of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate
that is subject to a lien only if—(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder
of the lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or equal lien is proposed to
be granted.”).
2
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forms of adequate protection that may be provided to a secured creditor to
satisfy sections 362(d), 363(e), or 364.6
As a matter of practice, such adequate protection rights may be
memorialized in a court order at the outset of a bankruptcy case approving
the debtor’s use of cash collateral. At the outset of a Chapter 11 case, a
debtor would seek court approval to use its cash which, under most
circumstances, would constitute collateral of its secured lenders. Such
court orders will typically condition the continued use of such cash
collateral on the continued adequate protection of the secured lenders’
interests in such cash to the extent of any subsequent diminution in value.
Such court orders could in theory memorialize an agreement between the
parties of the proper valuation standard to be used in the event of any
subsequent dispute over these adequate protection rights. There is no
reason to think that any such agreement would not be respected by a
bankruptcy court in the event of a subsequent valuation dispute.
That said, absent the memorialization of such a standard in a cash
collateral order, bankruptcy courts, historically, have calculated such a
diminution in value using one of two different valuation methodologies.
Some bankruptcy courts favored using a fair market valuation
methodology for calculating adequate protection of a secured creditor’s
interest in an asset that was retained and used by a debtor. These
bankruptcy courts concluded that the actual fate of the asset dictated the
use of fair market valuation methodology, given that the second sentence
of section 506(a) emphasizes the “proposed disposition or use” of the asset
to be valued.7 Other bankruptcy courts, however, favored using a
foreclosure valuation methodology for calculating adequate protection of
a secured creditor’s interest in an asset, even where that asset was retained
and used by a debtor. Relying on the scholarship of the former Chief Judge
Queenan of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Massachusetts, these bankruptcy courts concluded that the first sentence
of section 506(a), which emphasized the contractual “interest” of the
creditor in the asset to be valued, required the default application of a
foreclosure value methodology.8
The search for a particular valuation methodology in the absence of
governing language one way or the other necessarily has profound but
divergent consequences for creditor recoveries in a Chapter 11 proceeding.
11 U.S.C. § 361 (“When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or
364, of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be
provided by . . . .”).
7
In re Tenney Village Co., 104 B.R. 562, 566 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) (emphasis added);
Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 3-4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
8
See James F. Queenan, Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11,
92 COM. L.J. 18, 30 (1987).
6
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A hypothetical foreclosure valuation requires a bankruptcy court to value
the subject assets as if the secured creditor had foreclosed outside of
bankruptcy. For this reason, the hypothetical foreclosure valuation
methodology has been referred to as a valuation of assets “in the hands of
the secured creditor” or its collateral agent. Adoption of this methodology
will almost always result in a relatively low valuation of the subject
assets.9 This is because a secured creditor often lacks the operational
requirements needed to manage the assets: manpower, expertise, or
liquidity. And even if the secured creditor is operationally capable of
managing the assets, it may lack the proper regulatory consents necessary
to manage regulated assets.
On the other hand, adoption of a fair market valuation typically results
in a higher valuation of the secured creditor’s collateral. Measuring the
value of the assets in the debtor’s hands means that the bankruptcy court
need not apply a discount to account for the secured creditor’s lack of
operational abilities or regulatory consents.
Uncertainty surrounding the appropriate valuation methodology was
addressed in two recent Supreme Court decisions—Timbers10 and Rash.11
Although neither case addressed the valuation of collateral under section
506(a) for adequate protection purposes, each emphasized the “proposed
disposition or use” language in the second sentence of section 506(a) at
the expense of the “creditor interest” language in the first sentence of
section 506(a)—contrary to Judge Queenan’s preferred default
construction. In the aftermath of Rash, nearly every authority that
addressed the issue advocated the adoption of a fair market valuation when
such an asset was actually retained, used, or sold by the debtor.12
The issue was again litigated in the Residential Capital LLC Chapter
11 cases, where the bankruptcy court ultimately declined to resurrect the
Queenan default doctrine of requiring foreclosure valuation of a secured
creditor’s interest in collateral.13 As a result, the Residential Capital
decision, discussed infra, may have signaled the end of the practice of
defaulting to require a foreclosure valuation standard for calculating
diminution in value when a debtor continues to use or sell the assets at
issue.

9
10
11
12
13

Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 962 (1997) (8-1 decision).
Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988).
See Rash, supra note 9.
See infra § III (B).
In re Residential Capital, LLC, et al., 501 B.R. 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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II. THE “QUEENAN DOCTRINE” AS A DEFAULT STANDARD
Historically, absent specified language one way or the other in the
governing cash collateral order, some bankruptcy courts applied the
“hands of the creditor” valuation methodology when valuing collateral for
adequate protection purposes.14 These cases largely ascribe to a line of
reasoning which was championed in the 1980s by former Chief Judge of
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, James F. Queenan.
Judge Queenan believed that the language in the first sentence of section
506(a), related to the creditor’s interest, was determinative, and that the
second sentence (including the “proposed disposition or use” of the assets
to be valued) had no bearing on the appropriate valuation methodology.15
In his landmark article, Queenan argued that “with one exception [i.e.,
the proposed sale of the collateral] the selection of a standard for valuation
of security and mortgage interests in Chapter 11 should be based upon an
analysis of the rights and obligations of the secured creditor at foreclosure
rather than upon considerations such as the business prospects of the
debtor, the value of the collateral apart from the security interest, or the
purpose of the valuation.”16 Judge Queenan reached his conclusion, in
part, by focusing on the secured creditor’s interest in collateral rather than
the purpose of the valuation or the use or disposition of the collateral: “[I]t
would appear that, with one exception [i.e., the proposed sale of the
collateral], there is no reason for the purpose of the valuation to be more
See In re Case, 115 B.R. 666, 670 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (held, in a chapter 12 plan
confirmation case, that costs should not be deducted from a fair market valuation when a
debtor retains collateral but, in dicta, speculating as to the appropriate methodology in the
adequate protection context: “If we were attempting to value fmHA’s interest in the
property for adequate protection purposes, the possibility of forced liquidation would be
assumed and a deduction for selling costs would be logical”); In re Ralar Distribs., Inc.,
166 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (evaluating a 507(b) claim related to a piecemeal
liquidation of the debtor’s assets), aff’d, 182 B.R. 81 (D. Mass. 1995) (affirming on other
grounds and ignoring the adequate protection issue), aff’d, 69 F.3d 1200 (1st Cir. 1995)
(same); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 159 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (using
liquidation value when debtor’s business had no prospects of reorganization); In re
Keystone Camera Prods. Corp., 126 B.R. 177, 183–86 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (declining to
adopt going concern value for purposes of adequate protection because debtor’s business
had no prospects of reorganization); In re Rich Int’l Airways, Inc., 50 B.R. 17, 18 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1985) (recounting the legislative history of section 361); La Jolla Mortg. Fund v.
Rancho El Cajon Assocs., 18 B.R. 283, 289 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (“[I]n this regard, we
must evaluate the collateral, being the adequate protection in the hands of the claim holder.
It is the creditors’ expected costs to liquidate the property that is relevant, not those of the
debtor.”).
15
James F. Queenan, Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11, 92
COM. L.J. 18, 30 (1987) (“We are concerned here not with valuation of the property that
constitutes collateral but rather, in the words of the statute, with valuation ‘of such
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.’”).
16
Id. at 20.
14
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than a neutral factor in determination of the valuation standard, as
compared to the more descriptive statutory phrase ‘proposed disposition
or use.’”17
Indeed, many of Judge Queenan’s decisions reflect his approach to
section 506(a), focusing on the secured creditor’s interest in collateral and
ignoring the purpose of the valuation and the intended use or disposition
of the collateral.18 By focusing on the “value of such creditor’s interest in
property,” and ignoring the second sentence of section 506(a), Judge
Queenan repeatedly interpreted section 506(a) to require valuation based
on the creditor’s contract right to foreclose.19
Judge Queenan recognized that his preferred valuation methodology
was only appropriate under certain circumstances. For one thing, his
interpretation of section 506 in the adequate protection context as always
requiring a foreclosure valuation in the hands of the creditor would not
apply when the assets to be valued were actually sold.20 In Judge
Queenan’s words, “where the valuation is made in the context of the sale
of the debtor’s business as a going concern and the secured claim is to be
paid from the proceeds[,] . . . it would be ludicrous to adopt another

Id. at 28; see also id. at 29 (limiting discussion of the “use or disposition” language to
actual dispositions, liquidated or otherwise, contemplated in the case); id. at 30 (“We are
concerned here not with valuation of the property that constitutes collateral but rather, in
the words of the statute, with valuation ‘of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in
such property.’”); id. at 33 (stating that decisions applying retail value or going concern
value in the use context “lose sight of the fact that it is the creditor’s interest in the
collateral, and not the collateral, that is being valued.”); id. at 36 (“That the debtor is an
operating business, even one with excellent chances for a successful reorganization, may
make it less likely that foreclosure will take place, but it has relatively little to do with
valuation of the secured party’s rights in the collateral.”)
18
See, e.g., In re Ralar Distributors, Inc., 166 B.R. 3, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994)
(“Because section 506(a) determines the amount of a claim, this reference is clearly not to
the value of the collateral.”); In re Robbins, 199 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (“The
phrase ‘the value of such creditor’s interest’ is not equivalent to the value of the
collateral.”); In re Tenney Village Co., 104 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) (“Section
506(a) requires, however, a determination not of the value of the collateral but of ‘the value
of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . .” This interest
consists primarily of the right to foreclosure, and where the Uniform Commercial Code
controls, the obligations to do so in a commercially reasonable manner . . . .That a debtor
appears to be a viable business having going concern value might make foreclosure
unlikely, but it has previous little to do with valuation of the security interest. A security
interest is worth what it will bring at foreclosure.”); In re T.H.B. Corp., 85 B.R. 192, 196
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (“Legislative history indicates that the reference in § 506(a) to the
‘proposed disposition or use’ of the collateral was intended merely to make it clear that a
valuation in one setting would not be binding upon a valuation in another.’”).
19
See Ralar, 166 B.R. at 7; In re Tenney Village Co., Inc., 104 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1989) (Queenan, C.J.).
20
Queenan, supra note 15, at 28.
17
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standard or, if an actual sale has been negotiated, to use any value other
than the agreed price. That seems obvious.”21
Some bankruptcy courts disagreed with the Queenan approach even
outside of a sale context. These bankruptcy courts instead held that that
the second sentence of section 506(a) is determinative for purposes of
adopting a default valuation methodology. Cases using this approach
focused on the “use or disposition” of the collateral and held that, where
the collateral was to be used or retained by the debtor, bankruptcy courts
should, absent language in an order to the contrary, adopt a fair market
valuation to determine the extent of that asset’s diminution in value.22

III. SECTION 506(A) VALUATION AFTER QUEENAN
This split in authority—between Judge Queenan’s interpretation of
section 506(a) as requiring foreclosure value even for assets that were
retained and used, on the one hand, and those courts that instead adopted
default valuation methodologies based on the actual use or disposition of
the assets to be valued, on the other hand—was thereafter the subject of
two Supreme Court cases, Timbers and Rash.

A. Timbers and Rash
In Timbers, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted section 506(a) and
held that “the phrase ‘value of such creditor’s interest’ in section 506(a)
means ‘the value of the collateral.’”23 This was a direct reproach to the
statutory interpretation relied upon by Judge Queenan’s minority
approach, which had relied on the “creditor interest” sentence in section
506(a) to hold that liquidation value in the hands of the creditor was
(absent a sale) always the appropriate valuation methodology for an
See also In re Tenney Village Co., 104 B.R. 562, 566 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989)
(emphasis added); Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 3-4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (“The words ‘proposed
disposition’ would also have significance if the Debtor were attempting to sell the property.
It would then make sense to use fair market value as the base and discount that value to
reflect whatever the possibility might be that foreclosure would preempt the sale.”).
22
See, e.g., In re QPL Components, Inc., 20 B.R. 342, 345–46 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(“QPL is an ongoing business. The collateral involved is principally inventory. Applying
the law as discussed infra, the . . . liquidation value is clearly inappropriate.”); see Bank
Hapoalim B.M. v. E.L.I., Ltd., 42 B.R. 376, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (affirming bankruptcy
court’s utilization of an executed sale contract for valuation of sold collateral under section
506(a) to determine whether the secured creditor was adequately protected); In re Kids
Stop of Am., Inc., 64 B.R. 397, 401-02 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1986) (construing section 506(a)
in the adequate protection context, and concluding that secured creditor is entitled to
adequate protection because the collateral as of petition date was worth the amount actually
realized from asset sales during the case).
23
Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988).
21
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adequate protection valuation. In the aftermath of Timbers, the First
Circuit expressly overruled several of Judge Queenan’s pre-Timbers
decisions and adopted a fair market value methodology when the collateral
to be valued was proposed to be retained and used by the debtor.24
After Timbers, but before Rash, two Circuit Courts sought to resolve
the continuing split in authority regarding valuation methodologies under
section 506(a). In Winthrop, the First Circuit cited numerous cases on both
sides of the issue of the appropriate methodology to use when valuing
collateral proposed to be used or retained by the debtor, holding that the
appropriate methodology in such instances was fair market value.25 In
Taffi, the Ninth Circuit similarly considered the issue of whether to always
deduct hypothetical foreclosure expenses and held that, if the collateral is
proposed to be used or retained by the debtor, such expenses should not
be deducted.26 Although Winthrop and Taffi limit the use of liquidation
value, they cannot be read to mean that liquidation value in the hands of
the creditor is never appropriate, but rather that, absent governing
contractual language one way or the other, liquidation value in the hands
of the creditor should be limited to cases where the debtor proposes to
surrender the collateral or will be forced to surrender the collateral because
there is little chance of reorganization.27
Thereafter, in Rash, the Supreme Court again revisited section 506(a)
and again rejected Judge Queenan’s approach.28 In Rash, the Supreme
Court again directly refuted Judge Queenan’s interpretation of section
506(a), and stated the following: “We do not find in the §506(a) first
sentence words—‘the creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such
property’—the foreclosure-value meaning advanced by the Fifth Circuit.
Even read in isolation, the phrase imparts no valuation standard: A
direction simply to consider the “value of the creditor’s interest” does not
expressly reveal how that interest is to be valued.”29 The Supreme Court
In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Inst. for Savings, et al., 50
F.3d 72, 74-75 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting Judge Queenan’s article and cases); Bank Rhode
Island v. Pawtuxet Valley Prescription & Surgical Ctr., 386 B.R. 1, 4, n.3 (listing cases
overruled by Winthrop, including those authored by Judge Queenan).
25
In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d at 74.
26
In re Taffi, 96 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that by adopting fair market
value as the valuation methodology when a debtor retains and uses its property, the court
“put this circuit in harmony with all other circuits, except the Fifth, that have considered
the question.”).
27
See, e.g., In re Sharon Steel Corp., 159 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (using
liquidation value where “any hope of recovery in excess of liquidation value from the
Debtor’s assets is minimal”); In re Keystone Camera Prods. Corp., 126 B.R. 177, 186
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (using liquidation value where “there is not a reasonable chance of
reorganization”).
28
Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 962 (1997).
29
Id. at 961.
24
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held that the “proposed use or disposition” prong was of “paramount
importance to the valuation question.”30 The Supreme Court ultimately
held that, because the Chapter 11 debtor proposed to retain collateral under
a proposed plan, the replacement value standard “rather than a foreclosure
sale that will not take place, is the proper guide under a prescription hinged
to the property’s ‘disposition or use.’”31 Although Rash concerned a
Chapter 13 case, its direction that bankruptcy courts interpret section
506(a) to require valuation of an asset in accordance with its disposition
or use necessarily applies to any valuation under section 506(a).32

B.
Rash

506(a) Valuations in the Adequate Protection Context after

Outside of the adequate protection context, bankruptcy courts after
Rash overwhelmingly looked to the actual value realized on assets for
determining the value of those assets under section 506(a).33 As the court
in SW Boston Hotel Venture held, “[t]his case is similar to Urban
Communicators in that . . . an actual postpetition sale of a substantial
portion of Prudential’s collateral occurred in an arm’s length
transaction. . . . Under the rationale set forth in Urban Communicators, the
Hotel Sale price is the best evidence of the value of the Hotel and
establishes that Prudential was oversecured throughout these bankruptcy
proceedings.”34
Bankruptcy courts after Rash have likewise declined to apply
foreclosure value in the adequate protection context when a debtor actually
uses assets as part of a going concern.35 In Salyer, for example, the
Id. at 962.
Id. at 963.
32
See In re SK Foods, 487 B.R. 257, 262 n.11 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting an attempt “to
distinguish Rash by arguing that it involved a ‘cram-down’ provision of the Bankruptcy
Code” because “the reasoning and holding of Rash applies” to the adequate protection
context).
33
See, e.g., In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 479 B.R. 210, 223 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2012) (determining that the sale was “the best evidence of the value” of the collateral); In
re Urban Communicators, 379 B.R. 232, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d on other
grounds, 394 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The ‘disposition or use’ of such property was
(and with hindsight still is) the eventual sale of that property[.]”). In re Motors Liquidation
Co., 482 B.R. 485, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting application of a hypothetical
liquidation value, and noting that “because the [secured creditor] did not receive control of
the [collateral], each side, understandably, recognizes that the fair market value would not
be the value on liquidation.”).
34
In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 479 B.R. 210, 223 (B.A.P 1st Cir. 2012).
35
See, e.g., Bank Rhode Island v. Pawtuxet Valley Prescription & Surgical Ctr., 386
B.R. 1 (D. R.I. 2008); In re Savannah Gardens-Oaktree, 146 B.R. 306 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1992) (construing section 506(a) prior to Rash in the adequate protection context and
adopting going concern valuation for collateral to be retained and used); In re Automatic
30
31
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bankruptcy court was asked to reject a Rule 9019 settlement that was
premised on the secured creditor receiving contractual adequate protection
measured against going concern value of its collateral on the petition date.
As found by the district court on appeal, “the Bankruptcy Court did rely
upon the “going-concern” valuation of Debtors’ collateral that were “fixed
assets.” The Bankruptcy Court found that a going-concern sale of those
assets “is what was intended from the outset, [and] it was the basis on
which [creditor] had agreed to the debtor’s use of cash collateral, and it is
the scenario that actually resulted.”36
Likewise, in Pawtuxet, the District Court affirmed a bankruptcy
court’s adoption of going-concern value as the appropriate methodology
for valuing assets for adequate protection purposes. The bankruptcy court
concluded that the “proposed disposition or use” of the assets were of
primary importance in an adequate protection valuation “because the
reorganizing debtor proposes to retain and use the collateral, [and] it
should not be valued as if it were being liquidated; rather courts should
value the collateral ‘in light of’ the debtor’s proposal to retain it and
ascribe to it its going concern or fair market value . . . .”37 Given that the
assets valued in Pawtuxet were used rather than sold, the District Court
approved the bankruptcy court’s adoption of going-concern value as the
fair market value of those assets for adequate protection purposes.38
Similarly, bankruptcy courts after Rash likewise declined to apply
foreclosure value in the adequate protection context when a debtor actually
sells assets.39 As one court noted, “the evidence of the agreed value of the
Voting Machine Corp., 26 B.R. 970 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (for purposes of determining
whether secured creditor was adequately protected, rejecting evidence of liquidation value
and holding that going concern methodology is appropriate when collateral is to be retained
and used); In re Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1090, at
*20-23 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. Mar. 14, 2005) (unpublished) (construing section 506(a) in the
adequate protection context, and finding secured creditor to be adequately protected based
on real property’s going concern value in light of debtor’s proposal to retain property as a
going concern); In re Davis, 215 B.R. 824, 825-26 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 1997) (construing
section 506(a) in the adequate protection context in light of Rash, and holding that secured
creditor was adequately protected based on the car’s fair market value as of the petition
date when debtor intended to retain and use the collateral).
36
See In re SK Foods, L.P., 487 B.R. 257, 261 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
37
Id. at 4 (quotation omitted).
38
Id.; see also S.K. Foods, 487 B.R. at 263 (affirming Bankruptcy Court’s approval of
settlement, which “as required by Rash, properly relied upon the going-concern value for
those assets which were to be sold as part of the business as a going concern”); Bank
Hapoalim B.M. v. E.L.I., Ltd., 42 B.R. 376, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (affirming bankruptcy
court’s utilization of an executed sale contract for valuation of sold collateral under section
506(a) to determine whether the secured creditor was adequately protected).
39
In re Eskim, LLC, No. 08-509, 2008 WL 4093574, at *2-4 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Aug.
28, 2008) (unpublished) (permitting debtor to use collateral to bridge to a going concern
sale, and finding secured creditor adequately protected given that “the court’s accepted
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Property by the parties at the time of the respective acquisitions is the more
persuasive evidence of value offered at trial.”40 In Pelham, the bankruptcy
court construed section 506(a) in the adequate protection context in light
of Rash and rejected estimated liquidation value of collateral in the hands
of creditor given undisputed evidence that the collateral was actually used
as part of debtor’s going concern.41

C. Post-Timbers and Rash Holdouts
Even after Timbers and Rash, however, some authority continued to
default, in the absence of specific language in court order to the contrary,
to valuing assets that were retained and used based on their foreclosure
values for purposes of measuring the extent of any diminution in value that
may give rise to a need for adequate protection. The first instance, a bench
decision in the Scotia Pacific Chapter 11 cases did not mention Rash and
relied on Judge Queenan’s construction of section 506(a) in the adequate
protection context.42 The second instance was Colliers’ discussion of
section 506(a) valuation methodologies, which advocated a textual
approach to construing section 506(a) for purposes of valuing collateral
absent specific governing language in a cash collateral order.43

1. Scotia Pacific
The first such holdout was a bench decision issued by Judge Richard
Schmidt of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in the
Scotia Pacific Chapter 11 cases on July 7, 2008.44 That case presented
Judge Schmidt with a dispute centered along the familiar battle lines – to
ascertain whether certain noteholders were entitled to an administrative
claim under a cash collateral order, the bankruptcy court had to determine
whether or not the noteholders’ collateral had diminished in value over the
course of the case. Implicitly relying on the Queenan doctrine for valuation
in the adequate protection context, Judge Schmidt identified the issue as

valuation of the property depends on its being sold at a going concern value—not one of
foreclosure”); In re Walck, No. 11-37706 MER, 2012 WL 2918492, at *2 (unpublished)
(Bankr. D. Colo. Jul. 17, 2012) (construing section 506(a) in the adequate protection
context and holding, in light of Rash, that secured creditor is adequately protected based
on the fair market value of collateral projected to be earned by sale).
40
In re Pelham Enters., Inc., 376 B.R. 684, 690-93 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007).
41
Id.
42
In re Scotia Dev., LLC, No. 07-20027, slip op. at 23–24 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 7,
2008), aff’d in part by In re SCOPAC, 624 F.3d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 2010).
43
4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 506.03[6][b], at 506-37 (16th ed. 2013) (emphasis added).
44
In re Scotia Dev., LLC, No. 07-20027, slip op. at 23–24 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 7,
2008), aff’d in part by In re SCOPAC, 624 F.3d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 2010).
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“whether or not their interests have been diminished.”45 In accordance
with that doctrine, Judge Schmidt then proceeded to identify foreclosure
value “in the hands of the creditors” as the appropriate valuation
methodology:
The case law suggests that the Code provision for
protection for loss of secured creditors – the Code protects
the loss of secured creditors’ interest in the property. With
non-cash property, the interest that secured creditor has a
right to is the right to foreclose. Therefore, the caselaw
suggests that the appropriate value to protect is the
foreclosure value of the property and not the fair market
value of the property. Now, both sides have cited the In
re Stembridge case out of the Northern District of Texas
which states, even though it was reversed on other
grounds, it states: ‘With regard to the provision of
adequate protection, a secured creditor is entitled to have
his interest protected against diminution by reason of the
estate’s ongoing possession and use of creditor’s
collateral. The interest of the secured creditor is properly
valued from the secured creditor’s perspective. In other
words, the secured creditor must be protected such that
the total realizable from its collateral through foreclosure
does not decrease as a result of the delay imposed by the
bankruptcy case or the enforcement of its rights.46
Judge Schmidt went on, however, to conclude that even applying a fair
market valuation methodology, the creditors’ interests had not diminished
in value:
In fact, there’s been no evidence as to a decline in the
foreclosure value of the case, but even looking at the fair
market value, the evidence showed that from filing to
confirmation, the forests grew so that there are more
trees. . . . However, despite the increase in the forests and
the decrease in the discount rate, the Court believes that
the value of the forests has remained relatively constant
since the filing.47

45
46
47

Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 25-26.
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In fact, the next day Judge Schmidt clarified that the conclusion reached
in his bench ruling relied on both foreclosure value and fair market value,
on alternate grounds.48
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that fair market value would be the
appropriate methodology, but declined to reverse because the Bankruptcy
Court’s alternate holdings meant that its statements with respect to
foreclosure value did not constitute legal error:
In general, when valuing a secured claim under 11 U.S.C.
506(a)(1), fair-market value is the appropriate
measure . . . The Bankruptcy Court’s ruling from the
bench belies the argument that it looked exclusively to
foreclosure value . . . [Fair-market value] is the proper
comparison, and no legal error occurred.49
Thus it appears that the Scopac bench ruling’s decision concerning the use
of foreclosure value is of questionable precedential value going forward.

2. Colliers on Bankruptcy
Colliers on Bankruptcy constituted the second authority to advocate,
in the absence of specific language in a cash collateral order, the adoption
of foreclosure value even in the “retain and use” context notwithstanding
Rash. It does not, however, advocate in support of Judge Queenan’s
conclusion that the “creditor’s interest” in the first sentence of section
506(a)(1) requires the adoption of foreclosure value. Instead, Colliers
argues – without any case support – that the inclusion of the term
“purpose” in the second sentence of section 506(a) requires the adoption
of foreclosure value in the adequate protection context.50
As an initial matter, when the assets to be valued are sold, Colliers
agreed with Judge Queenan that the actual fair market value received for
the sold asset should be determinative of their value even in the adequate
protection context. According to Colliers:
[b] Value of Property Disposed of by Sale. Before
addressing the application of section 506 in contexts other
than the one presented in Rash, it is important to point out
See Brief of Appellees Mendocino Redwood Co. and Marathon Structured Finance
Fund L.P. at n. 19, In re SCOPAC, et al., No. 09-40307, 2010 WL 4601367 (5th Cir. 2010)
(“Now, keeping in mind I compared the amount you’re getting for what I thought was fair
market value, I mean I think the test would be the amount you’re getting compared to
foreclosure value. But I didn’t hold them to that.”).
49
In re Scopac, 624 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2010).
50
4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 506.03[6][b], at 506-37 (16th ed. 2013) (emphasis added);
see also id. at ¶ 506.03[4][a], at 506-22.
48
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that, regardless of the purpose of the valuation, if an
actual sale (or equivalent disposition) is to occur, the
value of the collateral should be based on the
consideration to be received by the estate in connection
with the sale, provided that the terms of the sale are fair
and were arrived at on an arms-length basis.51
But when the assets to be valued are to be retained and used (and not
sold), Colliers endorsed the adoption of foreclosure valuation
methodology, notwithstanding Rash’s emphasis on the actual “use” of
such assets. Specifically:
As explained in the legislative history to section 361, the
purpose of the adequate protection requirement is to
protect the creditor from loss occasioned by the Debtor’s
use, sale or else of the collateral while attempting to
liquidate or reorganize. The value to be protected is thus t
the value of the creditor’s current interest viewed from the
perspective of equivalent value
...
Selecting the creditor’s hypothetical use as the
appropriate benchmark for resolving the valuation
question mirrors the purpose of adequate protection.
Selecting the creditor’s hypothetical use best ensures that,
if the debtor does not pay the secured claim, the secured
creditor will be able to receive the same value that the
creditor would have received if the secured creditor had
exercised its enforcement rights against the collateral. It
is not realistic to assume that the secured creditor will be
able to recover from the collateral any higher value based
on the debtor’s use of the collateral if the debtor is not
able to reorganize or liquidate in such a way as to obtain
that higher value
...

4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 506.03[6][b], at 506-37 (16th ed. 2013) (emphasis added);
see also id. at ¶ 506.03[4][a], at 506-22 n.60 (“Of course, if the collateral is actually sold
during the course of the bankruptcy proceedings or pursuant to a confirmed plan, the
consideration received from the sale will almost always resolve the question of value.”);
id. at ¶ 506.03[4][a][i].
51
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Accordingly, for adequate protection purposes, the better
view is that the value of the collateral should be
determined in accordance with a hypothetical foreclosure
sale method. In applying that method, it is appropriate to
deduct any applicable costs of sale in arriving at the
ultimate value.52

IV. IN RE RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC
The Residential Capital Chapter 11 cases featured litigation over
precisely this issue. Over the course of their Chapter 11 cases, the ResCap
Debtors used, pursuant to a consensual cash collateral order,
approximately $600 million of cash collateral.53 As is typical, that order
entitled those bondholders to adequate protection claims to the extent of
any diminution in value of that collateral.54 Critically, the order did not
specify one way or another the proper standard for measuring such
diminution in value. Moreover, the Debtors had retained and used and sold
the assets at issue over the course of the ResCap chapter 11 cases.55
The ResCap Debtors commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a
declaratory judgment that the noteholders’ adequate protection claims had
no value because there had not been any diminution in value.56 For
purposes of determining whether the secured lenders’ collateral
diminished in value, the ResCap debtors argued that the Bankruptcy Court
must adopt a valuation of the noteholders’ collateral based on its value in
the event of a hypothetical foreclosure. They did not base their argument
on Judge Queenan’s construction, instead relying on Colliers’ point that
the “purpose” language in the second sentence of section 506(a) required
the adoption of foreclosure value when valuing assets in the adequate
protection context.57

4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 506.03[7][a][ii] (16th ed. 2013).
Proposed Findings of Fact of the Ad Hoc Group of Junior Secured Noteholders and
UMB Bank, N.A. at ¶ 173, In re Residential Capital, LLC, et al., No. 12-12020 (MG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2013), ECF No. 137.
54
Final Order under 11.U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 363(c), 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3),
364(d)(1) and 364€ and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 4001, and 9014 (I) Authorizing Debtor to
Obtain Post-Petitions Financing, (II) Authorizing Debtor to Use Cash Collateral, and (III)
Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties (“Dip Financing Order”), In
re SCOTIA Dev. LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 5, 2008).
55
Id.
56
First Amended Complaint to Determine Extent of Liens and for Declaratory
Judgment, In re Residential Capital LLC, et al., No. 12-12020 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June
19, 2013), ECF No. 8.
57
Adv. Pro. 13-01343, ECF 134 (Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law) at 42-43.
52
53
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The secured lenders, on the other hand, argued that the fair market
value of their collateral on the petition date—not the hypothetical
foreclosure value of those same assets in the hands of their collateral
agent—was the appropriate valuation methodology to apply for assets that
are not turned over but rather are retained and used by a debtor, consistent
with Timbers and Rash.58
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court declined to adopt the “hands of the
creditor” valuation methodology.59 The bankruptcy court relied on Rash
and rejected the Queenan interpretation of section 506(a):
In calculating the value of the lender’s secured claim, the
Court looked at the first sentence of section 506(a) and
observed that the phrase ‘value of such creditor’s interest’
did not explain how to value the interest. Therefore the
Court looked to the second sentence of 506(a) and held
that ‘the proposed disposition or use’ of the collateral is
of paramount importance to the valuation question. Based
on the proposed disposition of the property in that case,
the Court held that foreclosure value could not be the
proper methodology for valuing the secured creditor’s
claim. Rather, the court applied replacement value, the
amount a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller
for the collateral. Although this case involves the
consensual use of cash collateral in the context of a sale
under chapter 11, the reasoning of Rash is equally
applicable here.60
The bankruptcy court issued its ruling in light of its making a factual
finding that the “proposed disposition or use” of the assets to be valued
was always to be the use of such assets by the debtors to bridge to a going
concern sale—not to turn the assets over to the noteholders for
foreclosure.61

V. CONCLUSION
ResCap recognized that Rash finally rejected Judge Queenan’s
interpretation of section 506(a) in the adequate protection context.
Moreover, by declining to elevate the significance of the “purpose”
language in the second sentence of section 506(a) above that of “proposed
58
59
60
61

Adv. Pro. 13-01343, ECF 138 (Defendants’ Proposed Conclusions of Law) at 35-36.
In re Residential Capital, LLC, et al., 501 B.R. 549, 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id.
Id.
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disposition or use” in the second sentence of that section, the bankruptcy
court refrained from endorsing Judge Queenan’s judicial philosophy.
Implicit in ResCap’s holding is the textual recognition that, absent
language in a cash collateral order specifying one way or the other, the
“default” interpretation recommended by the Plaintiffs and Colliers would
have overstated and distorted the true meaning of the “purpose” language
in section 506(a) in the adequate protection context. According to Colliers,
on the other hand, the “purpose” of adequate protection is singular – that
is, it is always intended to protect the secured creditor on account of its
contractual right to foreclose as a result of the imposition of the automatic
stay.
ResCap’s holding is consistent with the text in the Code itself. A
careful review of the “purpose” behind the Bankruptcy Code’s adequate
protection provisions reveals that the concept is intended to accomplish
different objectives depending on its context, i.e., the “purpose” of
adequate protection in the context of a secured creditor’s lift stay motion
under section 362 differs significantly from the “purpose” of adequate
protection in the context of a Debtors’ use of collateral under section 363.
And in the absence of any contractual language, when a secured creditor
never moved to take possession of its collateral, and where a Debtor never
sought to turn over its assets, the “purpose” of adequate protection should
not be to protect a creditor’s foreclosure value but rather to ensure that it
is not economically prejudiced from the debtors’ use of that collateral.
Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code neither defines “adequate
protection” nor identifies its intended “purpose.”62 Indeed, section 361 is
not operative but rather tracks other Code provisions.63 And while the
legislative history of section 361 refers opaquely to the need to assure a
secured creditor of the “benefit of its bargain,” it provides no guidance as
to whether that benefit consists only of a creditor’s immediate right to
foreclosure or rather its right not to be prejudiced by the Debtors’
affirmative use of its collateral post-petition.64 To the contrary, the
legislative history for section 361 specifically provides that the “purpose”

11 U.S.C. § 361 (“When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or
364 of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be
provided by . . . ).
63
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (requiring adequate protection when a creditor moves to
lift stay under section 362), with 11 U.S.C. § 362(2) (requiring adequate protection when
a debtor seeks to use creditor collateral).
64
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 339 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295
(“[T]hough the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose of the section is
to insure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he bargained for.”).
62
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of adequate protection in certain contexts is to protect something higher
than foreclosure liquidation value.65
With no statutory or congressional guidance, bankruptcy courts
routinely conclude that the “purpose” of adequate protection under section
361 differs depending on whether adequate protection is sought under
section 361(1) or section 361(2)—i.e., the “purpose” of providing
adequate protection to compensate for the Debtors’ use of collateral under
section 363 (as opposed to compensating for the imposition of the stay
under section 362) encompasses something other than just ensuring the
creditor of its right to immediate foreclosure.66
The differing “purposes” of adequate protection when compensating
for the use of collateral under section 363 as opposed to the imposition of
the stay under section 362 was directly addressed in In re Alyucan
Interstate Corp.67 In that case, a secured creditor moved to lift the stay to
take possession of its collateral.68 The bankruptcy court noted that while
adequate protection under section 362 is intended to protect a creditor
“from any impairment in value attributable to the stay,” under “sections
363 and 364 the answer would be [to protect] from any impairment in
value attributable to the use, sale, or lease or grant of a lien on the interest
of property.”69 The court found the secured creditor to be adequately
protected, and explained:
Some cases have interpreted adequate protection more in
terms of contractual benefits than economic values. They
have focused on language in the legislative history
suggesting that secured creditors must receive the ‘benefit
of their bargain.’ H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 339 (1977). Congress, however, was not referring to
the contractual bargain between creditors and debtors
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840 (“Neither is
it expected that the courts will construe the term value to mean, in every case, forced sale
liquidation value or full going concern value.”).
66
See, e.g., In re 495 Cent. Park Ave. Corp., 136 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(adequate protection is designed “to safeguard the secured creditor from diminution in the
value of its interest during the Chapter 11 reorganization”); In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790,
804 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (“The purpose of adequate protection is to assure that the
lender’s economic position is not worsened because of the bankruptcy case.”); In re
Hollins, 185 B.R. 523, 528 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995) (“Adequate protection seeks to protect
a creditor from an [sic] decline in the value of its collateral . . . .”); see also Harvey R.
Miller & Martin J. Bienenstock, Adequate Protection in Respect of the Use, Sale or Lease
of Property, 1 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 76 (1984) (“Generally, going concern value is most
compatible with rehabilitation cases.”).
67
12 B.R. 803, 808 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 808, n. 11a (citing to section 361).
65

66
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because the next portion of the House Report
acknowledges ‘there may be situations in bankruptcy
where giving a secured creditor an absolute right to his
bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the
bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section (Section 361)
recognizes the availability of alternate means of
protecting a secured creditor’s interest. Though the
creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose
of the section is to insure that the secured creditor receives
in value essentially what he bargained for.70
The long term impact of the Residential Capital ruling with respect to
the interpretation of section 506(a) remains unclear. As an initial matter,
parties are always free to agree on language in a cash collateral order
specifically memorializing one type of valuation standard or another.
There is no reason to think that such language would not be respected to
the extent subsequently challenged in court.
Absent such specified language in the governing court order, it
appears that the ultimate fate of the asset at issue is dispositive for purposes
of the appropriate valuation methodology to be adopted by the Court.
Adoption of a foreclosure valuation methodology, for example, may make
perfect sense – and would be consistent with Timbers and Rash – to the
extent that the actual use or disposition of such assets was a foreclosure
for the secured lenders. In this sense, Residential Capital merely ratifies
what many bankruptcy courts have previously recognized – that, postRash, the default standard for valuing an asset is in accordance with its
actual disposition or use. But in extending the Rash valuation default
analysis to the adequate protection context, it appears that Residential
Capital has rendered obsolete the last remaining authority adhering to
Judge Queenan’s now-defunct default standard that required in all
circumstances, regardless of the actual use of collateral, the adoption of a
foreclosure valuation standard for purposes of applying section 506(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code.

70

Id.

